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Abstract 
Based on micro-level analysis of the developments in the steel sector in Poland, Romania and 
Slovakia, this paper examines the effects of multinational corporations (MNCs) on labour unions 
in Central and Eastern Europe. It makes a three-fold argument. First, it shows that union 
weakness can be attributed to unions’ strategies during the restructuring and privatization 
processes of postcommunist transition. Consequently, tactics used for union regeneration in the 
West are less applicable to CEE. Rather, the overcoming of postcommunist legacy is linked to 
the power of transnational capital. Through attritional and enabling effects, ownership by MNCs 
forces the unions to focus their efforts on articulating workers’ interests. The paper examines 
the emerging system of industrial relations in the sector and explores the development of the 
capabilities needed to overcome postcommunist legacies.  
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Introduction 
 
The weakening of trade unions in Western Europe has in large part been attributed to the 
consequences of globalization and neoliberal policies (Urban, 2008). Faced with shrinking union 
membership, scholars and practitioners alike have turned their attention to the question of whether a 
labour movement renewal can be expected, and what variables might affect this process. As revitalization 
research expands to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), it is important to keep in mind that the unions in 
the region face an additional obstacle, namely the need to overcome the crippling legacies of the 
transition process.  
In this article, we examine the relationship between globalization, epitomised by multinational 
corporations (MNCs), and the overcoming of the legacies of transition in CEE - a precondition to union 
revitalization in the region. Our argument is three-fold.  First, we argue that union weakness in 
postcommunist countries has various origins, stemming from variable experiences during the transition 
process. Even though domestically, the unions shared numerous communist legacies, and, externally, they 
were exposed to similar pressures of marketization and globalization, union leaders were also faced with 
specific, politically-underpinned choices during the transition process. These choices, in turn, led to 
different forms of marginalization.  
The second part of our argument holds that unlike unions in Western Europe, which face the 
imperative of revitalization following far-reaching market liberalization policies, the unions in CEE 
additionally need to overcome the specific challenges connected to the legacies of the transition process. 
In other words, to the extent that the postcommunist union marginalization resulted from poor 
representation of workers’ interests during transition, unions first need to establish their legitimacy as the 
representatives of workers.   
Third, we argue that privatization through sale to multinational corporations (MNCs)—the 
epitome of marketization and globalization—serves as an impulse for overcoming postcommunist 
legacies. The entry of MNCs has a dual effect: attritional and enabling. On the one hand, as in the West, it 
increases competition among subsidiaries and strengthens the bargaining power of the employers 
(attritional effect). However, the establishment of new capital-labour relations clearly delineates separate 
roles for the two actors and forces the unions to start acting as workers’ representatives, a precondition for 
regeneration. At the same time, the entry of MNCs provides opportunities for the exercise of international 
solidarity and exposure to coordinated sharing of information and practices, as through the 
institutionalized vehicles of the European Works Councils (EWCs), which helps empower unions 
(enabling effect). How the unions in CEE respond to the challenge of representing workers’ interests has 
implications for their ability to revitalize in the future. We find that in our cases, analysed unions have 
made significant progress in terms of adjusting themselves to the new role. However, the postcommunist 
past continues to cast shadow over the extent to which the unions are able to adapt to the new reality.  
We examine these claims by taking a comparative, micro-level approach, and we study the steel 
sector in three new EU member states: Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. We look at the steel industry 
because this was a sector where the unions were particularly strong under planned economy, lost a lot of 
legitimacy during the transition period, and did not seem well prepared to counterbalance the power of 
new, private, multinational owners. If unions were able to overcome postcommunist legacies, it would be 
a good sign of union renewal prospects in these countries. We carried out the research from 2003 to 2010 
and conducted about 150 interviews with trade union representatives, workers, employers, and state 
officials.  
The article is divided into five sections. In the next section, we discuss the theoretical framework 
of our study and embed it within the literature. In the subsequent sections, we present the micro-level 
empirical data. In section three, we discuss the progressive weakening of the unions in the three cases and 
in section four we turn to the signs of overcoming postcommunist legacies following the sale of these 
companies to MNCs. In the last section, we conclude and discuss the implications that the shedding of the 
postcommunist legacies has for union regeneration in the long term. 
Labour Decline and Revitalization in Comparative Perspective 
 
The degree of power to influence other relevant actors—such as employers or the state—is one of 
the key differences between a union movement that is experiencing decline and revitalization (Frege and 
Kelly, 2004, 32). According to Wright, labour power can be divided into associational and structural 
power. Associational power results from the collective organizations of workers including not just unions, 
but also political parties, works councils or even forms of institutional representation on boards of 
directors. Structural power flows from workers’ strategic location within a key industrial sector or from 
an advantageous position due to tight labour markets (Wright, 2000, 962). Workers’ loss of structural 
power has negative implications for their associational strength. The prevalence of neoliberal policies and 
globalization, entailing market liberalization and global sourcing, contracting and subcontracting, have 
everywhere led to decreased structural power of the workers due to subsidiary competition. The 
increasing bargaining power of employers also led to declining membership numbers of workers and to 
overall decline in labour’s associational power.   
The unions in CEE have faced other pressures, in addition to those of globalization, which 
contributed to their weakness. The literature on the causes of union weakness in CEE has focused on the 
macro-level factors that can be divided into external and internal. External causes include the legacies of 
socialism and etatism (Crowley, 2004; Ost and Crowley, 2001; Bluhm, 2006), high unemployment levels 
(Greskovits, 1998), and the free-market-promoting EU (Kutter and Trappmann, 2010; Bohle and 
Greskovits, 2006; Kubicek, 2004). Internal causes emphasize the lack of cooperation and coordination 
(Meardi, 2006) or of class consciousness (Ost, 2000). Building on the class consciousness argument, Ost 
has advanced the claim that the main challenge facing unions in CEE is the legacy of postcommunism, 
whereby unions weakened themselves by giving into the neoliberal reforms (Ost, 2009). 
The end of the transition period—or of postcommunism—marked by the entry of CEE countries 
into the European Union’s single market calls for a new assessment of the state of organized labour. As in 
the West, analyses of labour’s decline are slowly giving way to the examination of the prospects for 
labour revitalization. The relatively young literature on labour revitalization has developed a set of 
conditions influencing the process but its focus is on the Western experience, and its applicability as a 
framework for postcommunist CEE is limited. More fundamentally, it does not address a crucial source of 
weakness for existing union organizations, namely the legacies of the transition process.   
According to Behrens, Hamann and Hurd (2004) labour revitalization depends on unions’ 
bargaining power, political power, membership density, and institutional vitality. Most prominently, 
Frege and Kelly (2004: 33f) distinguish six different strategies of labour revitalization in Western Europe, 
intended to increase union power on the four aforementioned dimensions: union restructuring, organizing, 
coalition building, social partnership, political action, and international union action. The usefulness and 
success of the various strategies is context dependent and is influenced by the country setting as well as 
the industry and type of unions (Frege and Kelly, 2004: 33).  
Union restructuring entails organizational reform to increase efficiency, stimulate rank-and-file 
mobilization, expand democratic participation, and improve service provision, and is often considered a 
precondition for further revitalization (compare Turner, 2005: 386). Often, it includes mergers between 
individual unions or closer cooperation among union confederations. 
Organizing mainly intends to increase the associational power of labour by attempting to raise 
union membership. The problem of recruitment has been linked to path dependency of old-style 
strategies, which do not work in the new sectors, as well as to the weariness of elder union 
representatives. New forms of recruiting and new forms of unionism seem necessary to increase 
organizational power. Potentially fruitful avenues for organizing are closely related to coalition building 
with civil society and following a political mandate (Voss and Sherman, 2000). They include social 
movement unionism, and comprehensive campaigns and coalition building in an attempt to broaden the 
scope of union actions beyond the factory gates (Hurd, Milkman, and Turner, 2003). Social coalitions, in 
turn, can also enhance the potential for labour to exert political power, which can either result in more 
labour-friendly legislation or even in corporatist institutional structure (Frege and Kelly, 2004: 34).  
Social partnership with employers has strengths but also pitfalls as it can increase concession 
bargaining whereby workers surrender previously negotiated rights and benefits in exchange for greater 
job security. In the end, workers’ perception of too much concession on the part of the unions may 
undermine trust in union leadership. Finally, international unionism has increased with European 
integration thanks to the European Works Councils. 
Out of the six strategies outlined by Frege and Kelly, two are of yet limited applicability in the 
postcommunist world. First, coalition building is challenging given the current weakness of civil society 
in the region (Howard, 2003; Mrozowicki 2011; also compare Ost, 2005). Second, social partnerships are 
difficult in economies dominated by MNCs, where social partnership already lacked institutional 
entrenchment prior to MNCs’ entry.i Perhaps not surprisingly, given our argument concerning the need to 
overcome postcommunist legacies, union restructuring has not yet received scholarly attention.  
Thus, the nascent literature on labour revitalization in CEE focuses on the other three elements 
presented in Frege and Kelly’s framework, namely organizing, international union action, and, 
increasingly, political action. As for organizing, Krzywdzinski documents that Polish unions have 
initiated a new organizing strategy, with Solidarity employing and training professional organizers 
(Krzywdzinski, 2010).  
In terms of international union cooperation, Gajewska has detected some positive examples. 
Based on an examination of EWC at GM, the Service Directive, and the Laval case, she finds that path 
dependencies and legacies do not mean per se an obstacle to cooperation but that its emergence depends 
on actions of actors, and not on attitudes. Thus, situational interactions among unions foster solidarity. 
Embeddedness in the European trade union organizations, she argues, is particularly important for the 
long-term process of building international union solidarity (Gajewska, 2009). Unlike Gajewska (2009), 
who finds that unions differentiate between areas of competition and those of solidarity, Bernaciak (2010) 
finds that cross-border unions cooperate only if they see that they can benefit more from cross-border 
coordination than from local negotiations and concessions.  
As far as political action is concerned, particularly with the recent crisis, scholars have noted 
more radical union involvement than seen previously. Examples include demonstrating and campaigning 
for general welfare issues such as the rise of minimum wage, pension reform, and a cutback of 
flexibilization in Poland (Trappmann, 2011, 2012) or calls for a referendum in Slovenia (Stanojevic, 
2013).   
The cited studies representing the nascent literature on labour revitalization in CEE point to 
different manifestations of union regeneration in the face of neoliberal policies and globalization, but they 
do not address what we argue is the critical precondition for union revitalization: overcoming of the 
postcommunist legacy of not representing workers’ interests. Unless the mechanisms, and the degree of 
success, of overcoming the postcommunist legacy are addressed explicitly, existing union organizations 
may simply be unable to contend with the root cause of their weakness, and fail to regenerate 
successfully.  
Unlike Ost, who links postcommunist legacies to the lack of class identity, we show that union 
weakness resulted from context-dependent decisions union leaders made during the transition period. 
Consequently, as a precondition to union regeneration, union leaders must first overcome the context-
dependent legacy of not representing worker interests. In order to do so, they must develop a set of 
capabilities that will enable them to adjust to new, post-transition scenario, in which MNCs dominate the 
economic fabric. In discussing the determinants of union capacity, Levesque and Murray make a 
distinction between power resources and actor capabilities (Levesque and Murray, 2010: 336). Whereas 
power resources, such as those discussed by Frege and Kelly, are necessary, they are not sufficient to 
counteract external pressures affecting unions. In a scenario analogous to union revitalization, the new, 
post-transition context challenges ‘ways that union leaders and activists think about and develop their 
resources and organizational routines’ (Levesque and Murray, 2010: 336). Thus, union leaders need new 
capabilities. These include framing (such as defining a proactive and autonomous agenda); learning; 
articulating between different levels of action; and, perhaps most importantly: intermediating.   
The latter entails the ability to mediate between contending interests, foster collaborative action, 
and access and create salient social networks (Levesque and Murray, 2010: 335). For our purposes, 
learning and intermediating are the two most significant capabilities that need to be developed by union 
leaders in CEE in order to alter their strategies and reconcile any lasting hostilities that transpired during 
the transition period. These capabilities, in turn, manifest themselves in two specific aspects of union 
restructuring that are a precondition to further revitalization: union mergers and closer cooperation among 
confederations.  
The key question, then, pertains to the mechanism of developing these capabilities. We argue that 
the entry of MNCs completely changes the rules of the game and therefore provides a structural break in 
the unions’ postcommunist trajectory. In short, although the rise of MNCs is generally associated with the 
weakening of union power, in CEE MNCs contribute to the overcoming of the legacies of 
postcommunism, which is a prerequisite for union regeneration. 
 MNCs affect union power in the region in two ways that seem to work at cross-purposes, and 
which can be called attritional and enabling. Attritional effect refers to the tremendous pressure MNC 
presence puts on the workers. By introducing the threat of lay-offs or relocation, it strengthens the hand of 
the employers vis-à-vis the unions, making social partnership more difficult, and also complicates the 
potential for organizing. Political action, too, becomes more challenging as the government can deem 
involvement in the affairs of an enterprise as antithetical to economic reform. The lack of political 
efficacy might, in turn, lower the potential for coalition building. In essence, the MNCs force the unions 
into an adjust-or-perish scenario in which change of attitudes and behaviour by union leaders becomes a 
matter of organizational survival.  
At the same time, MNC presence also has an enabling effect in that it is associated with resources 
that both incentivize and reinforce changed behaviour: international solidarity and, especially, the 
European Works Councils (EWCs). External resources notwithstanding, however, the impulse for change 
must originate within the union itself.  
In the following sections, we examine our argument empirically. We employ a comparative 
framework to examine the origins of labour weakness and to analyse the existing signs of labour 
regeneration in CEE. Our analysis is based on micro-level analysis, which is best suited for analysing 
intra- and inter-union dynamics over time. We chose the steel sector based on its importance during the 
communist period. Thus, the more established unions in the respective sectors’ biggest plants, rather than 
the new start-ups, provide a good lens through which to examine the challenges connected to the 
communist past and postcommunist transformation. 
 Careful not to generalize based on shared communist legacies (but see Crowley and Ost, 2001), 
we selected the country cases based on the differences in the political economy of transition, even if all 
three aimed at eventual EU membership and were constrained by accession obligations. After all, the 
transition period may have established path dependencies (Stark and Bruszt, 1998). Poland, as the 
transition leader, was on the forefront of economic and political reforms. In what foreshadowed the 
eventual loss of union credibility, social dialogue was initially deemed unnecessary as Solidarity’s 
participation in a series of reformist governments was seen by the reformers as sufficient protection of 
worker interests. Despite alternation of parties in power, subsequent governments remained committed to 
both economic and political reform, with social dialogue eventually evolving into a consultative function, 
its efficacy lowered by peak-level splintering of unions along political lines.   
Slovakia at first also exhibited radical economic reform record, albeit the privatization process 
quickly became extremely politicized. After prime minister Vladimír Mečiar’s coming to power in 1994, 
privatization became the basis for establishing clientelistic relations between the government and its 
clients, including renegade trade unions, which were skilfully plied off the main labour confederation. 
Romania served as the most problematic case as far as both political and economic reform was concerned 
in that the Romanian transition process was marked by stop-and-go policies that featured economic and 
political reform non-starters and reversals. Organized labour was often used to fight political battles, with 
strategic splintering and exploitation of unions by political operatives.   
Although the developments in the three countries differed considerably, a common feature during 
the 1990s was that industrial relations at the national level were tripartite, i.e., the state consulted the 
unions and employer federations on questions of economic and social policy in order to ensure a peaceful 
transformation. Despite this, actual union influence through tripartite bodies was scant (Pollert, 2000: 
201; Ost, 2000). Their initially relatively high membership rates notwithstanding, the unions were not 
able to ensure implementation of the general agreements concluded at the national level (Myant et al, 
2000; Kohl and Platzer, 2003). 
Even though the steel industry was one of the few cases where social dialogue took place at the 
sectoral level, the main negotiations pertaining to work conditions and wages took place at the individual 
enterprises. As this section demonstrates, the developments at the enterprise level had a feedback effect 
that influenced the legitimacy of trade unions in the three countries.  
Three companies are central to our analysis: VSŽ – Východoslovenské Železiarne (East-Slovak 
Steelworks), Sidex Galaţi, and PHS – Polskie Huty Stali (Polish Steelworks), all of which are the biggest 
steelworks in the respective countries. Today, as a result of privatization, they are the subsidiaries of 
multinational enterprises. Slovak VSŽ was sold in 2000 to U.S. Steel and is now called U.S. Steel Košice; 
Romanian Sidex Galaţi was sold in 2001 to Lakshmi Mittal’s LNM Holdings and is now part of the 
ArcelorMittal concern as ArcelorMittal Galaţi. PHS was also sold to LNM Holdings in 2003, and, 
together with Arcelor Huta Warszawa, is today integrated into the parent concern ArcelorMittal as 
ArcelorMittal Poland.   
 
 
Postcommunist Legacies of Company-level Representation 
 
 Before we turn to the effects of MNC ownership on unions within these enterprises, let us first 
examine the dissimilar postcommunist pathways into weakness. These pathways were not only a 
byproduct of communist legacies, but also of the context-dependent decisions union leaders made in the 
course of transition from communism. As the following cases illustrate, whereas in Slovakia and 
Romania the loss of legitimacy stemmed from facilitating rent-seeking activities of patrimonial-style 
management, in Poland, the unions lost legitimacy after taking on the role of co-managers in the process 
of market-oriented restructuring. Since we analysed these processes in depth elsewhere, in what follows, 
we summarize the main events and the implications they had for union restructuring in the post-sale-to-
MNCs period (Sznajder Lee and Trappmann, 2010).   
 VSŽ, founded in 1965, was one of the most important enterprises in Slovakia, earning nearly 10 
per cent of the Slovak GDP, and employing 20,000 workers. Clientelistic relations with the Mečiar 
government ensured the management as well as the representatives of the enterprise-level union 
organization large stakes in the enterprise during its initial privatization in the 1990s. Soon thereafter, 
relations between the enterprise-level union organization and the politically independent sectoral union 
organization—O.Z. KOVO—deteriorated. In 1996, Mečiar’s popularity among the local union 
representatives of VSŽ prompted the union committee to leave O.Z. KOVO to found its own 
organization—Metalurg (Sznajder Lee, 2010). The move represented the government’s strategic attempt 
to weaken O.Z. KOVO, which was the strongest sectoral union within the Slovak Confederation of Trade 
Unions (Konfederácia Odborových Zväzov – KOZ SR).  The ultimate goal was the weakening of KOZ, 
which was very critical of Mečiar’s policies (Myant et al., 2000: 734). 
 The management, with Metalurg representatives’ knowledge subsequently found different ways 
of tunnelling money out of the enterprise. Growing dissatisfaction of the workers with the management, 
and the politics of personal enrichment of union representatives, were silenced with higher-than-usual pay 
for the workers (Sznajder Lee, 2010). At this time, VSŽ was a good example of the kleptocratic political 
capitalism of old boy networks (see Eyal et al. 1998), with informal meetings between politicians, 
management and Metalurg deciding the company’s destiny. 
 The moment of crisis came in 1998, shortly after the election that ousted Mečiar’s coalition, when 
foreign lenders declared cross default and the enterprise found itself on the brink of bankruptcy. The 
solution was an agreement with the banks followed by reprivatization to a strategic investor who would 
appease the foreign lenders. Throughout the negotiation process, the behaviour of Metalurg and its leader 
was clearly hostile, including an attempt to fire the new CEO. Nonetheless, the influence of Metalurg was 
diminishing, and it did not help to forge the final privatization agreement. The latter was positive for the 
employees in that it stipulated that the privatized enterprise, U.S. Steel Košice, would retain full 
employment for the following ten years, with employment restructuring only via natural attrition. 
Metalurg, as accomplice of the old management, had in the words of a company insider, ‘become 
irrelevant for the workers,’ whose main concern was the survival of the enterprise and the retention of 
workplaces (Sznajder Lee, 2010).  
The story of Sidex Galaţi shares significant similarities with the Slovak case. The enterprise, with 
37,000 employees, was a symbol of communist modernization, producing 80 per cent of Romanian steel 
and earning 4 per cent of Romanian GDP. Union politics within Sidex were also similar to VSŽ. Seeking 
to stifle the awakening civil society and independent union movement at an early stage, the illiberal 
National Salvation Front government convinced powerful union leaders to split their organizations away 
from the new union confederation structures. As early as 1991 local union leaders in Sidex founded their 
own organization, the Galaţi Ferrous Metallurgy Workers’ Trade Union Federation, which the 
government recognized as an equal negotiating partner at the national level besides Metarom, the new 
federation representing metalworkers (Sznajder Lee, 2010: 48).  
The 2001 privatization of Sidex Galaţi became the object of hard competition between the 
Romanian government, unions, and management on the one side, and external actors like the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the EU, on the other. Since the company was a significant 
loss maker and contributor to Romania’s budget deficit, international financial institutions (IFIs), 
especially the World Bank, pushed for privatization (Sznajder 2006). The government was reluctant, and 
the management and unions were opposed to privatization because they benefited from the status quo. 
Sidex Galaţi was encircled by hundreds of politically-connected asset-stripping companies, almost 1400 
in 2001, according to the Romanian prime minister (Sznajder Lee, 2010). Also, the employees enjoyed 
high wages and employment security. The management used militant workforce as a convenient excuse to 
solicit additional financial resources from the government for salaries and working capital and to resist 
privatization. 
 As a result of theft and mismanagement by the management and its allies, Sidex’s debt exceeded 
one billion dollars by 2000. Under pressure from the IFIs, the Romanian government decided to privatize 
Sidex and changed the management to one more open to privatization. The enterprise-level union tried 
hard to stall the process, formulating different conditions for its consent to privatization, and threatened 
militant actions if these conditions were not met. The union eventually resigned itself to privatization, and 
the government chose Lakshmi Mittal’s LNM Holdings as the strategic investor in July 2001. Most 
importantly from the workers’ perspective, the deal provided for employment restructuring using only 
natural attrition for the first five years. However, similarly to the case of Slovakia, this guarantee was not 
so much a result of union activities as it was of the government’s concern for a region plagued by an 
already high unemployment (Sznajder Lee, 2010). 
 Restructuring in Poland proceeded quite differently from the Slovak and Romanian cases. First of 
all, the political context was different in that the Polish unions were not used instrumentally by the 
government to reach political objectives. Second, unlike the Slovak and Romanian cases, enterprise-level 
unions took an active part in enterprise restructuring. Considering employment cuts inevitable, they tried 
to cushion them with sectoral employment restructuring agreements. When—under massive pressure 
from the EU—PHS was eventually put up for sale, it had already been in large part restructured with the 
unions’ help. This included the 1999 sectoral employment restructuring agreement, called the 
Metalworkers’ Social Package, which provided for the departure of 57,000 workers from the sector.   
The unions also founded subsidiaries to provide employees with a positive example of how 
private economic initiatives can operate successfully. Understanding themselves as co-managers 
concerned with preserving the parent enterprise and believing in the success of the entrepreneurial 
initiative, they advised employees to become entrepreneurs. Instead of advocating for the protection of the 
employment contract, the unions preferred to negotiate a suitable severance pay that would later allow the 
workers to become self-employed, and they even offered special courses on ‘How to start your own 
business’ (Trappmann, 2013). In particular, Solidarity’s orientation to the free market economy (see also 
Ost, 2000) and the strong belief in the virtues of free entrepreneurship caused the unions to follow a 
radically market-driven strategy.   
Finally, the unions also considered privatization to a foreign investor the key to the survival of the 
companies, and thus, in 2003, they pressed for privatization even when the government was stalling. The 
unions’ almost pro-active participation in restructuring had distanced them from the rank-and-file 
membership. Even numerous union members in leadership position in the companies expressed criticism, 
as the following quotes illustrate: ‘[t]he unions have sold out. They're not even unions any more. They 
teamed up with those who just wanted to sell the company. The workers were of no interest to them;’ 
‘The unions have failed. They’ve completely lost their power. They can’t do anything more for the 
workers. They simply don’t have any role now’ (Trappmann, 2013).  
 Thus, the weakening of the unions in the Polish steel industry is strongly related to the role they 
chose in privatization and restructuring. Their attempt to save the enterprises, and their exaggerated view 
of free entrepreneurship permitted them to take on the role of co-managers. However, it was not a matter 
of positive forms of co-determination or co-management. Rather, in their claim to represent the 
employees, the unions followed a radical market position, which disillusioned the employees. 
 To summarize, even though Poland on the one hand and Slovakia and Romania on the other 
followed different pathways, both sets of unions suffered from a self-inflicted wound and weakness prior 
to their enterprises’ privatization to foreign investors. They entered the post-privatization period with the 
dire need to develop new capabilities and strategies.  
 
 
Attritional and Enabling Effects of MNCs and Overcoming Postcommunist 
Legacies 
 
 By completely changing the rules of the game, privatization to foreign investors represents a 
structural break in the unions’ postcommunist trajectory. The unions can no longer use their ties to the 
management, either as rent-seeking allies or co-managers feeling responsible for the enterprise. Rather, 
they face the need to alter their behaviour because of the attritional effect of MNCs: high bargaining 
power of the employers, increasing flexibilization of work and employment relations, competition among 
subsidiaries within MNCs, and resulting uncertainty about the future of entire groups of workers.   
 
 
Attritional Effects: Social Dialogue and Implications for Social Partnership and Political 
Action 
 
Changes in social dialogue in the three sectors and enterprises reflect the power of employers 
following privatization to MNCs. Although the negotiations with the new owners take place more 
regularly, employers are much better prepared to defend their interests. They tend to focus on company-
level negotiations, and even at the sectoral level, they try to speak with one voice.  
In Poland, in 2008, the Polish Steel Association representing employers in the sector declared the 
sectoral agreement void and proposed the negotiation of a new one.  Given the heterogeneous economic 
performance of enterprises in the sector, the new proposed agreement strives to be more flexible and 
lowers the provisions to the lowest common denominator.  Reluctantly, the bigger sectoral federations 
accepted the new arrangement and proceeded to focus their energies on the enterprise level. However, the 
adoption of the new, watered-down agreement has been blocked by a small federation, the All-Poland 
Association of Continuous Operation Employees.  
 In Slovakia, the sectoral agreement had also been a source of friction with the union leaders. 
After the 2005-2007 collective agreement for the sector expired, the unionists proceeded to negotiate a 
new one, but they refused to sign the agreement in 2008 and 2009 due to the ‘low level of commitment 
and entitlements’ proposed by the employers. They were afraid that the lowered standards would 
negatively impact future negotiations at the enterprise level (O.Z. KOVO union leader, 2010, electronic 
communication). Eventually, in 2010, the unions and the employers agreed upon a sectoral agreement. 
 Romania’s developments followed a similar pattern. After the 2004-2008 sectoral-level collective 
agreement expired, it was only renewed in July 2010 because the employers and the unions could not 
come to an agreement. However, the union leaders seemed satisfied with the sectoral agreement they 
were able to negotiate, which represented an improvement over what amounted to a non-existent social 
dialogue during the years 2005 to 2009 (interview, Metarom leader, 14 July 2010). In all three cases, the 
tendency to loosen or avoid sectoral agreements altogether has grown stronger as employers try to 
relegate social dialogue to the level of the enterprise. This trend makes the prospects of establishing 
robust social partnership much more difficult. 
 The key developments take place at the level of the enterprise, with social dialogue becoming 
much more adversarial. Even in Slovakia, where labour relations seem to proceed more smoothly, 
compared with the previous (Slovak) management, according to the interviewed union leader, ‘the current 
negotiations are much more demanding.’ However, contrary to the situation under the Slovak 
management, the provisions agreed upon are also implemented (interview, O.Z. KOVO union leader, 10 
October 2010).  
 In Poland, social dialogue at the level of the enterprise entailed much tension and mutual mistrust 
in the initial post-privatization period. The unions continue to perceive the new management as a tough 
negotiating partner and it took both sides five years to negotiate a new enterprise-level collective 
agreement that was to follow the privatization pact that expired at the end of 2009.
ii
 Solidarity and OPZZ 
both emphasize the necessity of dialogue but reject strikes as a relatively useless tool that would only 
serve managerial interests.
iii
 Rather, union leaders see rational negotiation based on facts and figures as 
the key tool of social dialogue. However, the more the tensions increase, the more willing they are to 
protest, as recently happened at ArcelorMittal Poland sites. 
 The relationship between the unions and the management is the worst in Romania where unions 
perceive the management as obstructionist and uncooperative. Negotiations surrounding collective labour 
agreements are tough, with the unions characterizing the social dialogue between 2005 and 2009 as 
amounting to ‘zero’ (interview, Metarom leader, 14 July 2010). Moreover, the management claims that 
the unions lack ‘any strategy for workers’ representation’ (interview, ArcelorMittal Galați human 
resources management, 14 July 2010).  
In addition to poor prospects for establishing robust social partnership with employers, a factor 
notable for its absence in the context of changed social dialogue in the examined enterprises is the 
perceived lack of institutional support by the state.  In Poland, union leaders bitterly quoted the minister 
of the economy as saying that ‘the government is not interested in a private company’ (interview, 
Solidarity leaders, 9 July 2010). In Slovakia, the union leader said that ‘employers supported by the 
liberal government try to weaken us...They think unions are an obstacle for further development’ 
(interview, O.Z. KOVO leader, 10 October 2010). The Romanian leaders went even further, claiming that 
‘we have powerful enemies in Romania: the government and the management’ (interview, Metarom 
leader, 14 July 2010). Especially in Romania, the unions have witnessed a significant loss of influence, 
with the government cutting back labour law and union rights (Trif, 2013).  
Although the perception of the state’s dismissive attitude took on different intensities in the three 
countries, in all of them the unions made it clear that they were left to their own devices. At the same 
time, even though the state has withdrawn from the sector, foreign owners have not hesitated to use their 
political channels to help lobby the national governments.
iv
 Thus, state withdrawal and perceived 
abandonment of the sector in all three cases has made it more difficult to use political action as a strategy 
for union revitalization. 
 
 
 
Enabling Effects of MNCs: International Union Action and European Works Councils  
 
In addition to its crippling attritional effects, the entry of MNCs explicitly promotes a specific 
aspect of union capability, namely learning, by facilitating participation in international unionism. EU 
membership, in particular, incentivizes and reinforces the development of union capabilities through 
Directive 94/45/EU establishing European Works Councils (EWCs). 
The new structures of EWCs contribute to the union representatives’ understanding and assertion 
of their role as representatives of workers’ interests through several means. As documented in the 
literature, the positive effects include gains in information and legitimacy through the integration into the 
transnational employee representation body (Meardi 2004). With the exception of U.S. Steel Košice, the 
enterprises examined here can put forward members for the EWCs. Because of the still comparatively 
high employment figures in the Polish and Romanian plants, these countries are well represented in the 
ArcelorMittal EWC, with each country having nine members out of a total membership of fifty four.  
 Although the overall power and influence of the EWC is limited and also considered marginal by 
its members from Poland and Romania, it has two important implications for the unions. First, the 
enterprise-level unions at ArcelorMittal Poland see an improvement in the internal cooperation among 
unions because of the EWC pressure for coordination. Second, according to their own estimation, it helps 
in rationalizing unions’ thinking and improves their situation vis-à-vis local management. Because they 
often gain information via the EWC that they would not have otherwise obtained from the management, 
they are better informed about the fate and the future plans for their companies and can plan their strategy 
accordingly (interview, Solidarity leaders, 7 July 2010; interview, leader of Independent, Self-Governing 
Labour Union of Workers of ArcelorMittal Poland S.A., 9 July 2010). 
 The union leaders also claim other positive effects, even if unintended. For example, the 
Romanian union leaders stated that the exchanges in the EWC enabled them to learn from the unions in 
other countries about their reactions to the crisis. The experience helped them produce proposals for 
government anti-crisis measures. Self-critically, the Romanian leaders claimed that they should become 
more active in the EWC (interview, Metarom leader, 14 July 2010).  
 Linked to the effects of EWCs, yet analytically separate, is the question of emerging international 
solidarity that has the potential to spur union regeneration. For example, Western European unionists 
assist their counterparts from CEE in labour organizing efforts, especially as far as greenfields and the 
service sector are concerned (Ost 2009: 21-22; Trappmann, 2011).  International labour solidarity is a 
work in progress, as labour leaders learn to overcome significant obstacles stemming from differences in 
short-term interests. In our cases, one such disagreement pertained to whether the size of the delegation to 
the EWC should be determined by production output or by the workforce size, given that the latter 
seemed overstaffed to the Western unionists.
v
  
 Nonetheless, international labour solidarity is growing and collaboration as part of the EWCs 
facilitates the development of mutual trust; Polish unionists point to united protests by unionists against 
layoffs across ArcelorMittal as a sign of solidarity developing across borders. We also find increased 
cooperation at the sectoral level, where unions participate in joint projects on qualification and training as 
well as on social dialogue. However, while solidarity across union lines in Europe may be emerging, the 
ability of workers to act collectively across borders remains inferior to that of employers from 
transnational corporations.  
 
 
Overcoming Postcommunist Legacies: Union Mergers and Cooperation 
 
MNC entry encourages the development of two capabilities that are crucial for overcoming 
postcommunist legacies: learning and intermediation. Participation in international unionism fosters 
learning and helps change the way unions perceive their role. The adjust-or-perish scenario brought about 
by the attritional effects of MNCs, on the other hand, creates the need to develop intermediation 
capability, whereby union leaders learn to mediate between contending interests and foster collaborative 
action. If they are successful at developing intermediation skills, union leaders are able to undertake 
internal restructuring that takes the organizational form of mergers and increased cooperation aimed at 
overcoming the transition-era weakness and divisions.  
By far the most obvious change that occurred under the new ownership was the tendency of the 
unions to merge and overcome the politically-inspired divisions that took place during the early and 
intermediate years of transition. These developments were closely tied to generational change and to the 
retirement of individuals who had a personal stake in the divisive status quo. In Slovakia, Metalurg and 
O.Z. KOVO merged at the end of 2009, once all the union leaders who favoured the 1996 split had 
retired. Realizing that unity was required to represent workers effectively in economically difficult times, 
union leaders left the political turbulence of the Mečiar era behind. Notably, the persisting political 
differences among union leaders did not stand in the way of the merger which strengthened the position 
of the unions (interview, O.Z. KOVO leader, 10 October 2010). In the words of O.Z. KOVO’s president: 
‘Integration is intended for us to become stronger, more professional, to have better economic resources 
and greater opportunity to influence what happens in enterprises throughout the sector.’vi 
 A similar phenomenon took place in Romania, although the Romanian case cautions us that it 
takes intermediating skills, not just mere generational change, to guarantee union cooperation. In 2006 the 
Galaţi Ferrous Metallurgy Workers’ Trade Union Federation joined Metarom to form the 
steelworker union FSS Metarom (Federaţia Sindicatelor din Siderurgie Metarom, FSS Metarom) (Chivu, 
2009). The reasons for the merger were similar to the Slovak case: after privatization, the close 
relationship between the unions and the management was eradicated and the leaders who had a stake in 
the old system retired. Faced with the new economic reality, new, younger union leaders realized the need 
for a stronger voice and recognized the obsolescence of the old arrangements. In fact, not only was the 
young leader of the Galaţi-based federation welcomed at Metarom, he was subsequently elected as 
Metarom leader in December 2006 (interview, Metarom leader, 14 July 2010). 
 Generational and organizational change, however, was not sufficient for effective representation 
of workers. ArcelorMittal Galaţi also presents lingering postcommunist legacies in terms of the approach 
to worker representation. Shortly after the merger, a new force emerged within the enterprise: Solidarity 
Union of Steelworkers at Arcelor Mittal Galaţi (Sindicatul Solidaritatea Siderurgistilor din Arcelor Mittal 
Galaţi). The latter is a militant organization whose recognition was resisted by the management and which 
very quickly proceeded to organize a large proportion of the workers, demand higher wages, and call for 
strikes.
vii
 The new union organization is led by a lawyer who advised the Galaţi Ferrous Metallurgy 
Workers’ Trade Union Federation in the mid-1990s and who returned to the enterprise to lead the new 
union. Solidaritatea finds itself in tough competition with Metarom, which it accuses of having been co-
opted by the management, an accusation Metarom reciprocates.
viii
 The strikes called by Solidaritatea have 
not been recognized by the Romanian courts and overall, the tactics have proven futile, as the 
management, in the words of the unions ‘does not negotiate with terrorists’ (interview, Metarom leader, 
14 July 2010). Putting it more mildly, the management claims that ‘It is not the company’s policy to raise 
wages as a result of a strike’ (interview, ArcelorMittal Galați human resources management, 14 July 
2010). The union conflict and competition hinders union effectiveness in representing workers and has 
led other union leaders in Romania to compare the situation in the Galaţi plant to union competition 
Romania faced in the mid-1990s (interview, Cartel Alfa leader, 15 July 2010). 
Problems with intermediation also hinder the opportunities offered by EWCs. According to 
Solidaritatea representatives, EWC membership application requires prior European Metalworkers 
Federation (EMF) membership, which in the case of Solidaritatea is blocked by FSS Metarom (interview, 
Solidaritatea leader, 15 July 2010). Thus, postcommunist legacies still cast a shadow that prevents taking 
advantage of coordinating mechanisms at the supranational level.  
 In the case of the Polish steel sector, because unions were not split by political machinations, 
there was no need for a post-transition reconciliation and mergers. However, greater capacity for 
intermediation is exemplified by tightening mutual cooperation unions established before privatization. 
According to the interviewed leaders, unions now cooperate better under pressure even though political 
differences persist between them at the peak level (interview, leader of Independent, Self-Governing 
Labour Union of Workers of ArcelorMittal Poland S.A. (OPZZ-affiliated), 9 July 2010). Since most 
union leaders are in their late fifties and sixties, this greater cooperation is not yet facilitated by 
generational change within union leadership, but rather, by the development of new capabilities.
ix
    
With the increased downsizing of the workforce, partially in response to the economic crisis, 
union organizations at the plant level now focus both on the increase of employability of the remaining 
highly trained workforce and put forth demands for increased pay as the productivity of these plants 
approaches those in the West. Thus, as David Ost predicted, even in Poland, where the unions have 
shown much understanding for the managerial concerns for workplace productivity during the economic 
crisis, the unions have underscored that their patience is over. With the workforce cut and productivity 
rising, bringing about wage parity with Western European colleagues will be the priority (Ost, 2009).
x
 
Moreover, in addition to overcoming the legacy of co-managerialism, the unions in Poland have 
also shown signs of revitalization, with Solidarity actively using new strategies to organize agency 
workers. These activities, not surprisingly, are resisted by the management of the agencies supplying the 
workers (interview, Solidarity leader, 9 July 2010). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
As attention turns from the analysis of the sources of union weakness to union regeneration in 
CEE, it is important to keep in mind that the application of the strategies of union regeneration used in the 
West needs to take into account the unique challenges faced by the unions in the region. Thus, unless 
scholars and practitioners pay attention to the degree to which unions have been able to overcome the 
different legacies of the transition process, they run the risk of overestimating the degree to which the 
unions are able to regenerate. Consequently, greater attention needs to be paid to the mechanisms through 
which unions overcome their postcommunist legacies. In this piece, we discussed one major—if 
surprising—force, namely the presence of MNCs in the region.   
Our research has shown that despite shared communist legacies and challenges of transition, the 
weakness of postcommunist labour, especially at the enterprise level, resulted from different trajectories. 
These trajectories were a product of the internal political dynamics of the countries in question and 
personal decisions of union leadership, often resulting from incentives offered by the transition 
governments. However, for all the differences between the Romanian and Slovak trajectories on the one 
hand, and the Polish one on the other, the challenge the unions faced was the same: the loss of legitimacy 
in representing workers. 
 Sales of enterprises to MNCs represent a structural break in the unions’ trajectories. Having 
arrived in the capitalist world, the unions have faced the need to redefine or reinterpret their mandate. 
With the entry of transnational investors, the informal management-union relations gave way to 
increasingly formal structures. This meant that whatever activities the unions were engaged in, be it rent 
seeking or active management role, had to be adapted to the new, formalized capitalist conditions. In 
order to adjust to the new conditions, the union leaders have faced the need to change their capabilities, 
and to overcome their postcommunist past, which is a sine qua non of union regeneration. 
The advent of globalization in the form of sales to MNCs thus has a dual effect. On the one hand, 
as everywhere in the world, MNCs make union regeneration more difficult given the increased structural 
power of employers. At the same time, the harsh new conditions force unions to come to terms with their 
postcommunist legacies. Moreover, the entry of MNCs also facilitates some tactics, which might spur 
future union regeneration, such as union cooperation, international union action, and, in the case of the 
EU, the informative effects of EWCs. However, the process of overcoming the postcommunist past is 
certainly not automatic, as the Romanian case illustrates. Despite some headway being made, the shadow 
of postcommunist relations still affects the capabilities of the new actors. Not only does it affect internal 
union restructuring, but it also affects the unions’ ability to take advantage of the benefits of EWCs.  
Even though MNC entry promotes the overcoming of postcommunist legacies, the unions still 
face very challenging conditions as far as revitalization is concerned. However, these are now far more 
similar—if more intense—to those faced by their Western counterparts. Going forward, unions face an 
enormous organizational task at all three levels: enterprise, sectoral, and national, and it seems that more 
transnational cooperation on the unions’ side would offer a promising impulse for further union 
revitalization. Based on the evidence in the three enterprises, we believe that the unions, successfully in 
Poland and Slovakia, and less successfully in Romania, have taken significant steps to overcome their 
postcommunist legacies, an important prerequisite to revitalization. Contrary to the claims that 
globalization undermines labour in the East as well as in the West, we find more evidence that 
globalization in the East has a counterintuitive effect of improved representation of workers’ interests by 
the unions.   
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